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Abstract: The objective of this project was to create a low-cost, robust 
anticipatory wireless sensor network (A-WSN) to ensure the 
security and reliability of the United States’ energy infrastructure. 
This project has shown the feasibility of an intelligent wireless 
sensor network for the protection of electrical infrastructure. 
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DISCLAIMER  
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United 
States Government.  Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor 
any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal 
liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any 
information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not 
infringe privately owned rights.  Reference herein to any specific commercial product, 
process or service by trade name trademark manufacturer, or otherwise does not 
necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the 
United States Government or any agency thereof.  The views and opinions of authors 
expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government 
or any agency thereof. 
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Eaton, in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) has completed a project that applies a combination of wireless 
sensor network (WSN) technology, anticipatory theory, and a near-term value proposition 
based on diagnostics and process uptime to ensure the security and reliability of critical 
electrical power infrastructure. 
 
Representatives of several Eaton business units have been engaged to ensure a viable 
commercialization plan. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), American Electric Power 
(AEP), PEPCO, and Commonwealth Edison were recruited as partners to confirm and 
refine the requirements definition from the perspective of the utilities that actually 
operate the facilities to be protected. Those utilities have cooperated with on-site field 
tests as the project proceeds. 
 
Accomplishments of this project included: (1) the design, modeling, and simulation of the 
anticipatory wireless sensor network (A-WSN) that will be used to gather field 
information for the anticipatory application, (2) the design and implementation of 
hardware and software prototypes for laboratory and field experimentation, (3) stack and 
application integration, (4) develop installation and test plan, and (5) refinement of the 
commercialization plan. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Maintaining and upgrading the security and reliability of the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure is of utmost importance for the defense and economic security of the 
United States. In particular, we must provide physical security for the energy system and 
energy supply as these form the fundamental critical infrastructure of this system. Recent 
terrorist attacks have increased concerns about willful attacks on the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure. The importance of protecting the energy infrastructure comes from the fact 
that it serves as the foundation for all other infrastructures e.g. manufacturing, industrial, 
and services.  “The U.S. energy infrastructure is complex, aging, taxed almost beyond 
capacity, and vulnerable to acts of terrorism. Our Nation’s energy infrastructure consists 
of a diverse set of highly vulnerable systems. The U.S. Power grid has more than 200,000 
miles of transmission lines served by four regional grids located across North America. 
The grid is divided into Electricity Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Sectors. 
These sectors contain a nationwide network of power plants fueled by natural gas, 
nuclear energy, oil, and coal, as well as a physical network of gas pipelines, refineries, 
communication systems, and substations. Each system and region has specific 
vulnerabilities and single points of failure, open to either a physical or electronic attack. 
 
To address this national urgency, this project will create a low-cost, robust, Wireless 
Sensor Network (WSN) incorporating Anticipatory Technology to enable pervasive, real-
time threat sensing as well as assessment and evaluation of the physical security of the 
Nation’s critical energy infrastructure. The system will implement a threat-aware, self-
configuring wireless network based on Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Network (LR-
WPAN) technology with a reasoning system capable of interpreting and integrating 
spatially and temporally distributed, multi-spectral data and asynchronous information 
while postulating assertions about threats using Anticipatory theory.  The system will 
plan and execute reasoning profiles to support its hypothesis in a distributed fashion.  The 
proposed multi-phase project plan uses modeling and simulation to deliver to the DOE 
quantifiable metrics for the network’s performance including measures of robustness and 
effectiveness. The proposed technology will offer demonstrably superior performance to 
wired and other wireless alternatives while not adding any new vulnerability to the 
physical security of the energy infrastructure. Wireless sensor network technology 
fundamentally transforms the architecture of physical security systems by allowing 
ubiquitous distributed sensors to be cost effectively deployed throughout environment of 
the critical infrastructure. Advanced distributed algorithms using Anticipatory technology 
adaptively determine vulnerabilities and failure modes of the security system. 
Alternative, centralized intelligent systems are untenable due to the amount of processing 
power required and the variable system delays existing in geographically large areas. The 
Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Network (LR-WPAN) is a new technology emerging 
from the communications revolution in commercial and industrial wireless sensor 
networks. Unlike Wireless LANs (WLANs), LR-WPAN is designed to convey 
information without requiring pre-established network setup. Self-configuration and 
multi-hop capabilities are key attributes of LR-WPAN that enable large scale, mesh type 
networks to be formed to cover long distances and provide redundant paths within large 
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facilities. LR-WPAN is ideally suited to perform sensing and serve as a platform for 
assessing and evaluating threats by incorporating anticipatory technology.  
 
Wired solutions are not practical due to the large cost associated with deployment and 
maintenance. For example the cost of installing wires in a nuclear facility can be as high 
as $2000/ft. In a similar manner, non-LR-WPAN wireless technologies require large 
installation costs due to required configuration (by specialized personnel) and the need 
frequent maintenance. On the other hand, LR-WPAN technology was specifically 
designed for operation in industrial environments with enough features to allow for the 
creation of self-configuring mesh networks with a minimal cost on a per node basis and 
focus on enabling WSNs. IEEE 802.15.4 LR-WPANs use direct sequence spread-
spectrum techniques to mitigate the effect of jamming and improve wireless 
communications reliability. 
 
Anticipatory technology does not depend on repeating or preprogrammed patterns. 
Current pattern recognition technology does not work well since by definition terrorism is 
unpredictable. Anticipation, modeled after the human’s intuition to reason, enables the 
system to begin to react even before the event starts to unfold. 
 
Potential impact of the project: Current communications technology requires expensive 
and labor intensive approaches to assure integrity. Emerging technologies in 
communications offer the opportunity to protect without huge capital investment and 
impact on the supply conduits being protected (easily retrofitted). It has separate 
reporting channels, does not impact existing networks (already overloaded), can be 
deployed in a non-invasive way and could be used for other emergency situations. Self-
configuring, self-healing LR-WPAN technology will allow retrofitting the Nation's 
critical energy infrastructure with a scalable and pervasive physical security sensor fabric 
that has the ability to detect threats in real-time. Eaton's Innovation Center (EIC) and 
Eaton Electrical (EE) Group expect to implement this technology broadly across non-
nuclear electrical delivery assets as well as fuel processing and storage assets and 
delivery systems.  
 
3. ANTICIPATORY THEORY - BACKGROUND 
 
Intelligence is exhibited by a biological organism through its self-consistent reasoning 
mechanism that allows it to extract context- and environment-specific motive and intent.  
Similarly, within a collaborating system of intelligent agents each is self-aware and 
understands the local context within which it exists, the global implications of its actions, 
and its obligations as a member of the collaborative system.  These cognitive abilities are 
an essential component and developing them for threat-evaluation applications is one of 
the basic goals of the proposed research.  Reasoning abilities include the decision-making 
in a dynamic environment to be able to make informed reliable real-time decisions in the 
face of a dynamically changing process environment along with autonomous behavior to 
make decisions on its own or as part of a larger aggregate system.  
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The above figure shows the process flow in the energy infrastructure and respective areas 
of the proposed technology implementation. The event topology is mapped in order to 
develop the anticipatory reasoning construct. This event topology must be at a level 
where aggregated behavior can be anticipated and analyzed in terms of threat prediction 
and risk assessment. The behavioral level system architecture is shown below: 
Decision Framework 
    
Wireless Network 
Information Extraction 
from Sensors 
Conceptually, any reasoning system intended for use with network-centric information 
grids must have three key features.  These are (1) cognitive software for aggregating and 
intelligently processing network-centric data to formulating hypothesis concerning 
threats, (2) supporting software to proactively acquire and preprocess network-centric 
data, and (3) an intelligent communications infrastructure to dynamically manage an ad-
hoc network of geographically-disbursed non-homogenous information sources to obtain 
optimum stability regardless of traffic volume.  Additionally, it would have to be 
formulated as a dissipative system; that is, be able to recover from anomalies and 
disturbances without impacting reasoning and confidence in any hypothesis or assertion. 
The information abstraction in any such network is illustrated in the following figure. 
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4. RF SITE SURVEY OF ROANE COUNTY SUBSTATION 
 
The purpose of this radio frequency (RF) survey is to empirically analyze the RF 
environment in the Roane County Substation and study the propagation characteristics by 
observing the received signal strength levels. The three different frequency bands chosen 
mainly are 902-928MHz, 2.4-2.4835GHz and 5.725-5.875GHz. These frequency bands 
correspond to the unlicensed Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) bands, commonly 
used in current wireless networking technologies. The collected data will help understand 
the background interference and noise levels before the deployment of the desired 
wireless network and also help predict signal strength and related propagation issues. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the aerial map of the substation and the location of each of the 
measurement points. The measurement points are limited by the availability of working 
power outlets. The substation currently does not have any wireless sensor network 
installed but planned in the near future. The substation has antennae on top of its control 
room which appeared to be a microwave link to other TVA facilities. The details of the 
transmissions done over this links will be provided to the team shortly. Two calibrated 
test antenna, an Electro-Metrics rod/discone antenna and an EMCO horn antenna are 
used for recording the signals. These antennas were mounted on separate tripods and 
elevated. These antennas were then connected to the Aeroflex CS65040 Broadband 
Signal Recorder and Generator (hereafter referred to as the CS65040) and a Rohde & 
Schwarz FSH3 spectrum analyzer (hereafter referred to as the spectrum analyzer) that 
was controlled with LabView software.  Losses of the test cables were measured prior to 
the tests.  
 
While reviewing these results, it is important to keep the ISM frequency bands in mind, 
they are 
• 902–928 MHz 
• 2400–2482.5 MHz 
• 5725–5875 MHz 
 
We look for signals specifically in these bands and have marked their approximate 
locations on the plots provided as appropriate.   
 
Notes About the Plots 
 
The CS65040 plots provided are the result of replaying the signals that were recorded 
during the test.  During the replay, interesting segments were captured for the report with 
a screen capture and inserted here as graphics.  The plots provided show the spectrum 
along with a display of time recent to that spectrum.  The spectrum is 130 MHz wide in 
all cases unless noted otherwise.  This span, along with the center frequency and 
Resolution Bandwidth (RBW) is noted at the bottom of each plot. 
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Figure 1: Aerial View of the Roane Substation with the Locations Marked 
 
  
 
The CS65040 analyzer has an anomaly that can be seen as two CW signals, one at  
–15 MHz from center and the other at +5 MHz from center.  The signal at –15 MHz 
pulses; the one at +5 MHz is constant.  They are present at these frequency offsets in all 
plots, in all frequency bands.  These signals should be ignored.   
 
The CS65040 spectrum plots provided show the instantaneous signal (in yellow) along 
with the result of a maximum hold (in green).  Each sample taken with the CS65040 
analyzer was the result of 400 million samples per second and was recorded for the 
duration of the memory limit of the analyzer which is 2.6 s.   
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The Rhode & Schwartz FSH3 spectrum analyzer is controlled by a laptop running 
LabView software.  A customized script was used to scan the spectrum in five different 
bands for a total of 3 min per band.  The bands are 150 KHz to 30 MHz, 30 MHz to 
500 MHz, 500 MHz to 1 GHz, 1 GHz to 2 GHz, and 2 GHz to 3 GHz.  This results in a 
complete scan from 150 KHz to 3 GHz over a 15-min scan window.  The laptop records 
the frequency and power level at designated increments and records the maximum signal 
presented during the 3-min scan.  The RBW is 100 KHz.   
 
4.1 CS65040 Results 
 
Signals captured with e CS65040 analyzer are shown in the figures 2 thru 14.  Notes are 
included on each plot and items of interest are highlighted.  At the end of the section, a 
summary table is provided to summarize these highlights. 
 
Location 1: In Front of the Control Room 
Elevation: 803.5 ft 
N  35° 56.660’ 
W 84° 23.337’ 
Figure 2 shows a significant activity in 500MHz band and looked like a paging system in 
two channels at ~ 460 MHz. The noise floor in this band is about -70dB. Figure 3 shows 
the 900MHz band. This appears to be clean in the ISM band. It could be a good choice 
for wireless network considering the better propagation in this band. Figures 4 and 5 
show the band of interest, 2.4 GHz, with a resolution bandwidth of 20KHz and 100KHz 
respectively. There is significant usage at either ends of the 2.4 GHz ISM band. The 
average noise floor is around -80dB with peak transmissions as high as -55dB. The 
spectrum shows the activity in channels centered approximately at 2405, 2450, 
2475MHz. Figure 6 shows the channels of the 802.15.4 and 802.11b radios. The use of 
802.15.4 radios should avoid the above mentioned channels for efficient operation. These 
observations calls for further investigation of the BER and PER measurements of the 
Eaton nodes intended to be used in the project for deriving optimal co-existence 
conclusions. 
 
 11
 
Figure 2: Plot centered at 500 MHz, 200KHz RBW 
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Figure 3: Plot centered at 900 MHz, 20KHz RBW 
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Figure 4: Plot centered at 2445 MHz, 20 KHz RBW 
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Figure 5: Plot centered at 2445 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
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Figure 6: Channels of 802.15.4 and 802.11b radios 
 
 
4.2 Location 2: Near 500V direct feeds  
Elevation: 785.4 ft 
N 35° 56.693’ 
W 84° 23.314’ 
 
Figure 7 shows a significant activity in 500MHz band and looked like the same paging 
system as observed in location 1. The noise floor in this band is about -70dB. Figure 8 
shows the 2000MHz band. There is significant activity in ~ 1980MHz which is close to 
PCS cellular communications. The microwave link in the substation could be using 
cellular service for communications (the confirmation of which will be done with TVA). 
Figure 9 is a plot showing the activity in the 1500MHz band. Figure 10 shows the 
2445MHz band with activity at 2445MHz and 2500MHz. The interference shown at this 
location is not same as location 1. Figure 11 shows the 5.8GHz band which is very clean 
with a noise floor of -70dB. 
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Figure 7: Plot centered at 500 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
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Figure 8: Plot centered at 2000 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
 
 18
 
Figure 9: Plot centered at 1500 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
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Figure 10: Plot centered at 2445 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
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Figure 11: Plot centered at 5800 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
 
4.3 Location 3: Across and Behind the Control Room 
Elevation: 777.3 ft 
N 35° 56.710’ 
W 84° 23.362’ 
Figures 12 through 15 show similar characteristics as locations 1 and 2. The substation is 
open with little or no clutter EM-wise. This is both an advantage and disadvantage for the 
planned network. There is little multipath and the network relies purely on line of sight 
there by requiring a reliable and dense mesh for coverage. 
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Figure 12: Plot centered at 500 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
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Figure 13: Plot centered at 800 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
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Figure 14: Plot centered at 900 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
 
 24
 
Figure 15: Plot centered at 2445 MHz, 100 KHz RBW 
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4.4 Frequency Domain Measurements at the Three Locations 
 
Figures 16 through 18 shows the IEEE standard complete frequency domain sweep plots 
of the ambient RF at the site. The bands described here are 150KHz-30MHz, 30MHz-
500MHz, 500MHz-1GHz, 1.0GHz-2.0GHz and 2.0GHz-3.0GHz. Each of the plots is a 3 
min average in the respective band. Figures 19 through 21 show the zoomed plot of the 
band of interest, 2-3GHz band. The noise floor at all the three locations is about -65dB 
which is consistent with the earlier CS65040 measurements. 
 
 
Figure 16: Frequency domain sweep of Location 1 
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Figure 17: Frequency Domain Sweep of Location 2 
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Figure 18: Frequency Domain Sweep of Location 3 
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Figure 19: Zoomed Frequency Domain Sweep of 2-3GHz at Location 1 
 
 
Figure 20: Zoomed Frequency Domain Sweep of 2-3GHz at Location 2 
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Figure 21: Zoomed Frequency Domain Sweep of 2-3GHz at Location 3 
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4.5 Antenna factor discone 
 
Settings for R&S spectrum analyzers 
 
ElectroMetrics broadband antenna.  To calculate the actual power spectral density values 
at the antenna location, the antenna factor (in units of dB m–1) is added to the voltage 
(units of dB re 1 V) at the input of the measuring instrument.  The R&S and CS65040 
analyzers display amplitude as dB re 1 mW (dBm) referenced to their 50-Ω inputs, so an 
additional factor of –13 dB must be included in to complete the field strength calculation. 
 
 E (dBV/m) = Reading (dBm)  + AF (dB*m–1) – 13 dB(V/mW) 
 
The antenna factor as a function of frequency for the ElectroMetrics broadband antenna 
is shown in Fig. 19. 
 
 
Fig. 22.  Antenna factor as a function of frequency. 
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4.6 Survey Conclusions/Recommendations 
 
As this series of plots demonstrates, sources of interference were found during the EMI 
tests done on November 3rd, 2005. The interferers seem to be the communications links 
used in the operational capability of the substation. The signals are band-limited and the 
particular channels can be easily avoided in our implementation of the network. There are 
no frequency-hopping transmissions. However it is recommended to do a complete co-
existence measurement using the proposed nodes to see the affect of this ambient RF on 
the future network. This can be done by measuring BER and PER by varying the 
channels of the 802.15.4 radios over long periods of time (an automated logging and 
channel shifting mechanism using the proposed nodes with measurements of more than 
one hour in each channel is recommended for significant extrapolation of the 
coexistence). The location is open with minimal clutter EM-wise which could be both an 
advantage and disadvantage. Lack of multipath makes the reliability of transmission to be 
on finding proper line of sight signal. This calls for a robust and dense mesh network 
implementation for efficient coverage of the substation. Alternate tradeoff is by using an 
enhanced power amplifier to boost the 15.4 radios to maximum power limited by ISM 
band. The delay-spread and signal fading characteristic measurements will provide more 
insight on how to tackle this problem. 
 
The 900-MHz ISM band was free from interfering signals in all the locations 
 
The 5-GHz ISM band was free from interfering signals in all the locations. 
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5. NOTIONAL CONSTRUCTS 
 33
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6. INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS (EVENT TOPOLOGY) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES: 
 
This project is based on using Bayes’ decision theory to derive various formulae for the 
classification and the parameter estimation of the given data. The Bayes’ rule is given as 
follows: 
P(wj/x) = p(x/ wj )P(wj )/p(x) 
The parameters are estimated using the following formulae: 
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From the parameters obtained the decision rule is designed to classify the given data. The 
designed decision rule is run on the testing data said using the pre-calculated parameters. 
After running the classification each data is classified as category 1 or category 2. The 
obtained results are compared with the available data and the error rate and the accuracy 
are calculated.  
 
 Bayesian Estimation of parameters and classification. 
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In this  the parameters µ and Σ are estimated again by treating this parameters as 
random variables themselves. The new formulae for the µ and Σ are as follows: 
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The values of  µ0  and σ0  are randomly chosen values by observing the given 
data. However I  chose µ0  by looking at the mean-matrix of the whole given data in the 
testing set , similarly the σ0.
 The classification is done based on the probabilities obtained by plugging in the 
Gaussian equation with the new parameters. 
 
∑∑ −−−=
− ))()(
2
1exp(
)2(
1)( 1
2/ n
t
nd
n
xxxp µµπ  
K-Nearest Neighborhood Estimation: 
 
  In KNN estimation, the volume is allowed to vary depending on the training data 
set. To estimate the p(x) from n samples, we can center a cell at x and let it grow until it 
contains Kn samples, and Kn can be some function of n. Ususally Kn  is taken as square 
root of n. If we wish to determine the statistics, a hypersphere of volume V which just 
encloses k points from the combined set. If within that volume, Km  of these points 
belong to class m, then we estimate the density for class m by : 
 
p(x/wm) = km / nm   p(wm) = nm/n  p(x) = k/nV 
 
 The decision rule tells us to look in a neighborhood of the unknown feature vector 
for k samples. If within that neighborhood, more samples lie in class i than any other 
class, we assign the unknown as belonging to class i.  
 
8. BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORK 
 
Bayesian belief networks are directed acyclic graphs where each node represents a 
random variable as described in Figure 1. The nodes in a Bayesian network represent 
propositional variables of interest and the links represent informational or causal 
dependencies among the variables. The intuitive meaning of an arrow from a parent to a 
child is that the parent directly influences the child. The direction of this influence is 
often taken to represent casual influence. These influences are quantified by conditional 
probabilities which give the strength of causal influence. Perhaps the most important 
aspect of Bayesian networks is that they are direct representations of the world, not of 
reasoning processes. The arrows in the diagram represent real causal connections and not 
the flow of information during reasoning (as in rule-based systems and neural networks). 
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The Bayesian network supports the computation of the probabilities of any subset of 
variables given evidence about any other subset. It allows one to calculate the conditional 
probabilities of the nodes in the network given that the values of some of the nodes have 
been observed. As new evidence comes in, it is tempting to think of the probabilities of 
the nodes changing, but, of course, what is changing is the conditional probability of the 
nodes given the changing evidence. 
 
Bayesian belief networks are effective and practical representations of knowledge for 
reasoning under uncertainty. They have many successful applications in many fields such 
as diagnosis, planning, learning, vision, natural language processing, and decision 
support systems. The latter involves interaction with human users, and therefore it is 
crucial that users be able to understand the underlying probabilistic model, its 
assumptions, and its recommendations. Since Bayesian networks are graphical models, 
they are cognitive and similar to human reasoning constructs, distributed algorithms for 
inference and learning, modular representation of knowledge, and intuitive (possibly 
causal) interpretation. In many of these applications, systems are fairly autonomous and 
their most important characteristic is the ultimate reasoning performance.  
 
A Bayesian network represents the assumption that each node is conditionally 
independent of all its ancestors given its parents. To specify the probability distribution of 
a Bayesian network, one must give the prior probabilities of all root nodes (nodes with no 
predecessors) and the conditional probabilities of all non-root nodes given all possible 
combinations of their direct predecessors. The conditional independence assumptions 
expressed by a Bayesian network allow a compact representation (fewer parameters) of 
the joint distribution and therefore lower sample and time complexity. As a consequence, 
it requires less data for learning and less time for inference.  
 
An example for detecting an attack on power substation using Bayesian network is shown 
in Figure 23. In this example, three seismic and three acoustic sensors are used to detect 
such an attack. The data collected from these sensors are fed into a pattern recognition 
program which allows each sensor to recognize a car (C), a man (M) or an animal (A) 
with certain probability. The classified objects for each sensor are fed into a regional 
central unit (one for acoustic and another for seismic) which makes a final decision on 
whether the detected object is C, M, or A. Note that seismic sensors are more accurate 
than acoustic sensors. This is reflected on the parameters of conditional probabilities for 
each sensor. Finally, based on the outputs of all regional central units, an attack is 
detected according to certain predefined criteria (cars means higher occurrence 
probability of attack, men less probable, and animals are the least probable).  
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Figure 23: A Bayesian network for the attack detection problem. 
 
 
The above example is simulated using Bayesian network toolbox in Matlab. The sensor 
nodes are chosen as observed discrete nodes. The probabilities of attack based on the 
readings of the sensors are computed and shown in Table 1. The probability distribution 
of attack for the third case (ACO S1 = C, ACO S2 = M, ACO S3 = M, SEI S1 = C, SEI 
S2 = M, SEI S3 = M) is plotted in Figure 24. 
 
Table 1: Probability of attack for various sensor readings. 
Acoustic Sensor Readings Seismic Sensor Readings 
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 P(ATT = T) 
C C C C C C 0.94 
C C M C C M 0.92 
C M M C M M 0.75 
M M M M M M 0.63 
C M A C M A 0.5 
M M A M M A 0.33 
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M A A M A A 0.008 
A A A A A A 0.001 
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Figure 24: Probability distribution of attack for case  
(ACO S1 = C, ACO S2 = M, ACO S3 = M, SEI S1 = C, SEI S2 = M, SEI S3 = M). 
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9. A WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK FOR AN ANTICIPATORY THREAT 
AWARE APPLICATION 
 
Scope: 
This section describes the design of the Wireless Sensor Network for the Anticipatory 
Threat Aware Application (ATA), hereafter referred to as A-WSN. The A-WSN goal is to 
gather the information needed by ATA to assert the presence of a threat. 
 
9.1 A-WSN Overview  
The A-WSN is comprised of: 
 
 Passive Infrared sensors 
 Acoustic Sensors  
 Seismic sensors 
 Coordinator 
 Relay nodes 
 Computer 
 
The physical components of the WSN are depicted in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25 WSN for Anticipatory Threat Aware Application 
 
The logical structure of the WSN is depicted in Figure 26. It is a hierarchical structure 
with three tiers. The third tier is comprised of sensor nodes, second tier is comprised of 
relay nodes that group sensor nodes logically associated with them, and the third tier is a 
group of relay nodes associated with the coordinator of the WSN. The main purpose of 
the hierarchical structure, from the WSN perspective, is to reduce the amount of 
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unnecessary data forwarded from the sensors to the computer where ATA is running, and 
to extend the coverage of the WSN. The former helps make the WSN scalable. The 
sensor nodes perform sensor-node processing to send relevant detection information. The 
relay nodes correlate the messages from the sensor-nodes in their corresponding groups 
and further reduce the unnecessary data transmission through group processing. Finally 
the coordinator forwards the group messages to the computer for the final 
assessment/classification via the ATA. 
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Figure 16 Logical architecture of the WSN 
 
• The network takes care of routing and other higher layer communication protocols 
using the Figure 8 stack (http://www.chipcon.com/).  
• The association between the sensor nodes and the relay nodes is done manually by 
assigning an application-layer address off-line that tells the node the group it belongs 
to and the type of node it is (i.e., sensor: PIR, acoustic, seismic; relay, or coordinator). 
• The operation of the A-WSN is given in Section 8.2. 
• The target area is approximately 10m long by 3m wide. The coverage of the WSN is 
based on the PIR sensors’ specifications (see Section 8.2.1) and it is depicted in 
Figure 27. Figure 27 shows the minimum number of PIR sensors needed. The actual 
number of sensors depends on the level of redundancy and confidence level sought.  
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Figure 27 WSN coverage area based on PIR sensors’ specifications 
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9.2 WSN Nodes 
All sensor-nodes have an ATMEL 128L/Chipcom CC2420 module. The antenna to use in 
the Relays and Coordinator are 9dBi gain antennas: 
(http://www.hyperlinktech.com/web/24ghz_802.11_rubber_duck_antenna_9dbi_nm.php)
, and the antennas for the sensor nodes are 2.5dBi antennas.  
 
It has been shown in several studies that near-ground communications tends to have 
higher path loss [1], [2]. The difference between path loss with antenna highs at a 
standing position with respect to lying position could be as much as 20dB. This can be 
resolved with more transmission power and higher antenna gains. 
 
9.2.1 Passive Infrared (PIR) Sensor Node 
The PIR sensor node is provided by Crossbow Technologies  (http://www.xbow.com/). A 
picture of this device is shown in Figure 28. The PIR has the following specifications: 
 
 Sensor: LHI878 
 Min. range: 0.2m 
 Max. range: 4m 
 Horizontal angle: 100◦ 
 Vertical angle: +/- 45◦ 
 Interface: 1-channel ADC 
 
 
Figure 28 PIR/Acoustic sensor 
 
 
Sensing algorithm of PIR sensor 
 
The sensing algorithm of the PIR sensor is based on [3] since the authors used the same 
micro-controller ATMEL128L.  
 
The PIR response is highly sensitive to weather conditions and surrounding vegetations. 
For example, moving foliage and thermal variations in the wind can affect the noise floor 
of the PIR sensor. It has been recommended in [3] to perform a frequency domain 
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processing of the signals out of the PIR sensor circuitry rather than a time domain 
processing. 
 
The signal values out of the PIR are passed through a digital high-pass filter given by the 
following recursion, 
 
1nPIR1nnn
0
mkssm
0m
−− +−=
=
  (1) 
 
The  parameter is found by experimentation, the authors in [3] use 0.9. This 
parameter depends on the desired cut-off frequency of the filter for the particular PIR. 
The noise level  is computed as follows, 
PIRk
ne
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≥+
<+
=
=
−−
−−
n1nn41n3
n1nn21n1
0
n
pepkek
pepkek
0np
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Where  is the maximum power of the filtered signal within a time window of  
samples, and . The parameters used in [3] are: , , 
, . The rationale behind (2) is to choose  small when  is larger 
than the noise ( ) to avoid increasing the noise too fast when a target is detected, 
and choose  large when a target is not around in order to decrease the noise quickly. 
The threshold of detection is proportional to . 
np noise_PIRW
1kkkk 4321 =+=+ 98.0k1 = 02.0k2 =
75.0k3 = 25.0k4 = 2k np
n1n pe <−
4k
ne
 
nPIR heTh =     (3) 
 
A crossing event for the PIR sensor is counted if, 
 
PIRt Ths >    (4)   
 
If (4) is true the algorithm considers that the PIR threshold has been crossed. The PIR 
confidence level is computed based on the ratio of total crossing events to total samples 
in a window of size equal to  samples (actual value may vary depending on 
experimentation). The PIR confidence detection level is the only value transmitted to the 
associated relay node. 
CDL_PIRW
The nominal sampling rate for the PIR sensor is 50Hz in [3] based on email exchanged 
with Lin Gu (author in [3]). 
 
9.2.2 Acoustic Sensor Node 
The acoustic sensor node is provided by Crossbow Technologies 
(http://www.xbow.com/). The acoustic sensor is physically located in the same box of the 
PIR sensor (see Figure 4). This is a microphone with following specs: 
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 Frequency range of 20-16KHz,  
 Sensitivity –46dB +/-4Db,  
 Omnidirectional  
 1-cahnnel ADC interface. 
 
Sensing algorithm of Acoustic sensor 
The signal values out of the acoustic sensor are passed through the following moving 
average operation [3], 
 
1t,11t1t,1
00,1
m)1(sm
sm
−−+=
=
αα   (5) 
 
where   is the current value of ,  is the previous value of ,  is the current 
microphone reading and 
t,1m 1m 1t,1m − 1m ts
1α  is a constant. The authors in [3] use 001.01 =α . 
 
In order to determine whether the acoustic threshold has been crossed we find out if 
 
t,2t,2t dmE +>     (6) 
 
Where 
 
t,1tt msE −= , and  
 
t,2t,2
1t,22
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−
−
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02.02 =α , , and  in [3].  0m t,2 = 0v t,2 =
 
If (6) is true the algorithm considers that the acoustic threshold has been crossed. The 
Acoustic confidence level is computed based on the ratio of total crossing events to total 
samples in a window of nominal size equal to  samples (actual value may vary 
depending on experimentation). The Acoustic confidence detection level is the only value 
transmitted to the associated relay node. The nominal sampling rate for the Acoustic 
sensor is 1000Hz in [3] based on email exchanged with Lin Gu (author in [3]). 
CDL_AcouW
 
9.2.3 Seismic Sensor Node 
The seismic sensor node is provided by Geospace Technologies  
(http://www.geospacelp.com/). A picture of the seismic sensor form factors is shown in 
Figure 29. The one in this project is the PC801 LPC. The response of the seismic sensor 
is shown in Figure 30.  
 46
 Figure 29 Seismic sensor 
 
ensing algorithm of Seismic sensor 
y signal conditioning. However, due to the low 
he signal values out of the seismic sensor are passed through the following moving 
−−+=
=
αα   (8) 
 
here  is the current value of ,  is the previous value of  is the current 
 
 
 
Figure 30 Seismic sensor frequency response 
S
The manufacturer does not specify an
frequency response of the sensor we will implement a moving average with tunable 
parameters as follows. 
 
T
average operation, 
 
1t,33t3t,3
00,3
m)1(sm
sm
w  t,3m 3m 1t,3m −  3m , ts
seismic reading and 3α  is a constant that needs to be found based on experimentation. 
Note that if 13 =α  the entire samples are untouched by any signal conditioning. 
 
In order to determine whether the seismic threshold has been crossed we find out if, 
t,3 >    (9) 
 
 
m seis_Threhold
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If (9) is true the algorithm considers that the seismic threshold has been crossed. The 
nfidence
.2.4 Relay Node 
ves as a message-forwarding node between the sensor nodes and the 
he relay node data processing Algorithm 
tection levels (CDL) of its associated PIR, 
 
 The relay node stores the values of the CDLs sent by all sensors associated with it. 
 
a) The relay node will transmit the V-CDL towards the coordinator if it has more 
b) within the last 
c) b) above are not 
 
 The different type of sensors have different reporting rate, therefore the relay node 
 
n example of a V-CDL construction is shown in Figure 31. Figure 31 assumes that the 
 PIR1, one from
Seismic confidence level is computed based on the ratio of total crossing events to total 
samples in a window of nominal size equal to CDL_SeisW  samples (actual value may vary 
depending on experimentation). The Seismic co  detection level is the only value 
transmitted to the associated relay node. The nominal sampling rate for the Seismic 
sensor is 20Hz. 
 
9
The relay node ser
coordinator. These nodes are used to extend the coverage range of the WSN and correlate 
the information coming from their associated sensors in order to reduce the probability of 
false positives and avoid forwarding data that is deemed unnecessary. The antennae of 
these nodes ideally have a higher gain than the ones used for the sensor nodes in order to 
ensure better communication between the sensor nodes and the coordinator. 
  
T
• The relay node gathers the confidence de
acoustic, and seismic sensors and constructs a vector of CDLs. Note that all the 
sensors of the same type have the same parameter values. 
•
This data is used to construct the vector of confidence detection levels (V-CDL), 
based on the V-CDL’s content the relay node decides whether to transmit or discard 
the V-CDL as follows, 
than one CDL from different sensors of the same kind with a value higher 
than or equal to X_CDLVTh − . Where X in the sub-index identifies the sensor 
type (i.e., PIR, acoustic, or seismic). Different sensors imply same type of 
sensor, but different units (e.g., two PIR sensors). 
The relay node will transmit the V-CDL if X_CDLVN −  
consecutive V-CDLs there is at least one satisfying a) above. 
The relay node will discard the V-CDL if conditions a) and 
satisfied. 
•
will receive more CDLs from the sensors that are sampled faster (e.g., Acoustic 
sensor). This has no impact on the application. The V-CDL is formed with a fix 
number of CDLs (e.g., Ten (10) CDLs) collected from all sensors in its associated 
group. 
A
relay node has six sensors associated with it, two PIR, two acoustic, and two seismic and 
that 5.0Th X_CDLV =−  (i.e., 0.5 for all sensors). Figure 31 shows that we have one CDL 
from  PIR2, one from SEIS1, one from SEIS2, four from ACU1, and two 
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from ACU2 (Total of ten CDLs). This V-CDL is sent to the coordinator because it 
satisfies condition a) above since at least two different sensors of the same type show 
X_CDLVX ThCDL −> . 
 
CDLPIR1 = 0.4 
CDLPIR2 = 0.5 
CDLACU1 = 0.3 
CDLACU1 = 0.4 
CDLACU1 = 0.6 
CDLSEIS1 = 0.6 
CDLACU1 = 0.5 
CDLACU2 = 0.3 
CDLACU2 = 0.3 
CDLSEIS2 = 0.7 
Figure -CDL. 
9.2.5 Coordinator node 
ordinator node per WSN. It collects the V-CDLs from the 
 
 The antenna of the coordinator is the same as the ones used for relay nodes.  
 The coordinator does not processes the data received from the relay nodes. The 
 
.2.6 WSN parameter configuration 
djustable Parameters 
o adjust relevant parameters of the WSN automatically in order 
he adjustable parameters are divided in two sets: 
arameters 
In-node sensing algorithm parameters 
the same parameters 
sed in [3] when available. 
 
1) PIR adjustable parameters are:  
 
: High-pass filter gain (.9):  [0,1] 
Time grows in this 
direction 
 31 Example of a V
• There is only one co
associated relay nodes and transfers that data via serial interface to the computer.  
•
 
•
coordinator forwards the information from the relay nodes to the ATA in a format 
specified in this document, and to the application that manages the WSN. 
9
 
A
It is necessary to be able t
to tune the sensitivity of the WSN to different targets and make experimentation and 
efficient data gathering a possibility.  The way the user adjust this parameters is detailed 
in this document. 
 
T
1) The in-node sensing algorithm parameters 
2) The relay node data processing algorithm p
 
• All the sensors of the same type have 
• In the following the values in parentheses are the ones u
Also the range for the parameter is specified after the semicolon. 
PIRk
 49
432 k,k,  : Error threshold adjustment gains (.98, .02, .75, and .25): [0,1] 1 k,k
(Constrained to 1kkkk 4321 =+=+ ). 
h : Proportionality factor of PIR crossing threshold: (0,100] 
 [1, 500] 
 
2) Acoustic adjustable parameters are: 
PIR : Sampling frequency of PIR sensor (50Hz): [10, 100] f
noise_ : Window size for noise estimation (250 samples):PIRW
CDL_PIRW : Window size for confidence detection level: [1, 500]  
 
1α : Constant for moving average (0.001): [0,1] 
2α  : Constant for moving variance (0.02): [0,1] 
 f sor (1000 Hz): [500, 2000] 
Acou :
 
3) eismic adjustable parameters are: 
 
rossing event threshold: [0, 5] 
 Acou  : Sampling frequency of Acoustic sen
 _W  Window size for confidence detection level: [1, 100] CDL
S
 
seis_Threshold : Seismic c
3α  : Constant o
      f sor: [5, 30] 
: [1, 50] 
 
elay node data processing algorithm parameters 
: V-CDL Threshold for PIR: [0,0.99] 
_CDLVTh − 0.99] 
 [1, 10] 
_CDLVN − ,10] 
 
 
9.3 WSN Operation Modes 
.3.1 WSN Normal Operation 
PIR, acoustic and seismic sensors will report their 
f moving average: [0,1] 
Seis : Sampling frequency of Seismic sen
CDL_ : Window size for confidence detection levelSeisW
R
• All relay nodes have the same parameters 
Relay node adjustable parameters and ranges: 
 
PIR_CDLVTh −
Acous : V-CDL Threshold for Acoustic: [0,
Seis_CDLVTh − : V-CDL Threshold for Seismic: [0,0.99] 
PIR_CDLVN − : Number of V-CDLs in a window for PIR:
Acous : Number of V-CDLs in a window for Acoustic: [1
Seis_CDLVN − : Number of V-CDLs in a window for Seismic: [1,10] 
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During normal operation the 
corresponding CDLs to its associated relay node, and the relay nodes will report their V-
CDLs to the coordinator if necessary. All parameters can be determined based on the 
targets that want to be detected via experimentation and during the SETUP operation 
mode of the WSN. 
 
Normal Operation Messaging  
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In what follows, node refers both to the relay and sensor-nodes unless explicitly 
he user of the WSN can START or STOP monitoring 
 NORMAL_START_REQUEST (unicast msg.: coordinator to nodes, and 
 ST (unicast msg.: coordinator to relay; relay to 
 ENCE_DET_LEVEL (unicast msg: sensor to relay) 
 
Fig
The proce
rom the coordinator and computer perspective:  
puter sends a NORMAL_START_REQUEST message 
first Relay node. After the coordinator receives the 
specified. In Normal operation t
data from the WSN. During START the nodes report data to the PC application, and 
during STOP the nodes are idle and do not send any data, waiting for a command. 
 
The high level messages in NORMAL operation are: 
application to coordinator) 
 START_RESPONSE (unicast msg.: coordinator to application) 
NORMAL_STOP_REQUE
sensors) 
 STOP_RESPONSE (unicast msg: sensors to relay; relay to coordinator) 
CONFID
 VECTOR_DET_LEVEL (unicast msg: relay to coordinator) 
 SANITY_CKECK (unicast msg: relay to coordinator) 
ure 32 shows the START monitoring procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32 Message exchange diagram for WSN START monitoring procedure 
 
dure is explained next.  
F
1) The application in the com
to the coordinator.  
2) The coordinator starts by sending a NORMAL_START_REQUEST message 
addressed to the 
VECTOR_DETECTION_LEVEL message from the first Relay node it continues 
and sends a NORMAL_START_REQUEST message addressed to the second 
Sensor_1:SEISMIC_
SENSOR
Relay_1:RELAY
NORMAL_START_REQUEST()
CONFIDENCE_DETECTION_LEVEL()
Tm(1ms)
Tm(1ms)
Tm(1ms)
Coordinator:COORDINATOR
NORMAL_START_REQUEST()
VECTOR_DETECTION_LEVEL()
Tm(2*n ms)
Computer:PC_App
NORMAL_START_REQUEST()
Sensor_2:SEISMIC_
SENSOR
NORMAL_START_REQUEST()
CONFIDENCE_DETECTION_LEVEL()
Sensor_n:SEISMIC_
SENSOR
NORMAL_START_REQUEST()
CONFIDENCE_DETECTION_LEVEL()
The coordinator will send a NORMAL_START_REQUEST msg. to all the Relay nodes in a round robin fashion until it gets a VECTOR_DETECTION_LEVEL() msg. from 
all. After the coodinator receives the last VECTOR_DETECTION_LEVEL() msg. after a NORMAL_START _REQUEST, it will send a START_RESPONSE(). msg
to the PC App.
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relay node if any. This procedure continues until the coordinator receives the 
VECTOR_DET_LEVEL of the last Relay node, after which the coordinator sends 
a START_RESPONSE message to the application 
All the VECTOR_DET_LEVEL messages sent by the relay nodes are received by 
the coordinator and forwarded to the a
3) 
pplication. After the last 
 
From the relay node perspective: 
) When receiving a NORMAL_START_REQUEST message the relay node will 
L_START_REQUEST message addressed to the first 
2) 
ues in the V-
 
Figure 
Figure 33 Message exchange diagram STOP monitoring procedure 
 
VECTOR_DET_LEVEL the coordinator sends a START_RESPONSE message 
to the PC application.  
1
start by sending a NORMA
sensor node in its group. After the relay receives the 
CONFIDENCE_DET_LEVEL message from the first sensor node it continues 
and sends a NORMAL_START_REQUEST message addressed to the second 
sensor node. This procedure continues until the relay receives the 
CONFIDENCE_DET_LEVEL of the last sensor node in the group. 
After receiving the last CONFIDENCE_DET_LEVEL, the Relay node constructs 
the V-CDL and forwards it to the coordinator regardless of the val
CDL and the size of it. The latter is to let the coordinator know if all nodes 
started. In normal state the V-CDL values are checked as detailed in to decide 
whether the V-CDL will be forwarded to the coordinator or not. 
33 shows the STOP monitoring procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for WSN 
Sensor_1:SEISMIC_
SENSOR
Relay_1:RELAY
NORMAL_STOP_REQUEST()
STOP_RESPONSE()
Tm(1ms)
Tm(1ms)
Tm(1ms)
Coordinator:COORDINATOR
NORMAL_STOP_REQUEST()
STOP_RESPONSE()
Tm(2*n ms)
Computer:PC_App
NORMAL_STOP_REQUEST()
Sensor_2:SEISMIC_
SENSOR
NORMAL_STOP_REQUEST()
STOP_RESPONSE()
Sensor_n:SEISMIC_S
ENSOR
NORMAL_STOP_REQUEST()
STOP_RESPONSE()
The coordinator will send a NORMAL_STOP_REQUEST message to all the Relay nodes in a round robin fashion until it gets a STOP_RESPONSE msg. from all.
After the coordinator receives a STOP_RESPONSE() msg. from the last Relay, it will inmediately send a STOP_RESPONSE() msg. to the computer 
App.
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The SANITY_CHECK message is sent periodically from every relay to the coordinator 
 a sensor node does not reply with a STOP_RESPONSE (or a 
ormal Operation Message Formats 
ORMAL_START_REQUEST (6 Bytes) 
8 bits (0) 
in order to inform whether the group of sensor nodes, and the relay node itself of that 
group, is alive. Every relay node needs to keep track of its associated sensor nodes. If a 
node is not responding it is assigned a status = 0, otherwise it is status = 1 in the 
SANITY_CHECK message.  
 
If
CONFIDENCE_DET_LEVEL) message (after the Fig8 protocol stack tries all its 
corresponding trials) the corresponding Relay node sends the STOP_RESPONSE 
(VECTOR_DET_LEVEL) message anyways and mark this node with status = 0 in the 
next SANITY_CHECK message it sends to the coordinator. 
 
N
 
N
Type: (0 = normal mode, 1 = setup mode) 
Message: 8 bits (0) 
Destination address 16 bits 
Source address 16 bits 
 
TART_RESPONSE (6 Bytes) 
mode) 8 bits (0) 
S
Type: (0 normal mode, 1 setup 
Message: 8 bits (1) 
Destination address 16 bits 
Source address 16 bits 
 
ORMAL_STOP_REQUEST (6 Bytes) 
8 bits (0) 
N
Type:  
Message: 8 bits (2) 
Destination address  16 bits 
Source address 16 bits 
 
TOP_RESPONSE (6 Bytes) 
8 bits (0) 
S
Type:  
Message: 8 bits (3) 
Destination address 16 bits 
Source address 16 bits 
 
ONFIDENCE_DET_LEVEL (8 Bytes) 
8 bits (0) 
C
Type:  
Message: 8 bits (4) 
CDL 16 bits 
Destination address: 16 bits 
Source address 16 bits 
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SANITY_CHECK (18 Bytes) (There are two (2) sensor types per group) 
Type:  8 bits (0) 
Message: 8 bits (5) 
PIR: node ID/status (status = 0 or 1) ts 8 bits+8bi
PIR: node ID/status (status = 0 or 1) 8 bits+8bits 
Acu: node ID/status (status = 0 or 1) 8 bits+8bits 
Acu: node ID/status (status = 0 or 1) 8 bits+8bits 
Seis: node ID/status (status = 0 or 1) 8 bits+8bits 
Seis: node ID/status (status = 0 or 1) 8 bits+8bits 
Destination address: 16 bits 
Source address: 16 bits 
 
ECTOR_DET_LEVEL (38 Bytes + 2 bits) 
8 bits (0) 
V
Type:  
Message: 8 bits (6) 
CDL 16 bits 
Sensor_Type (PIR:01, Acu: 10, Seis: 11) 2 bits 
Node ID 8 bits 
CDL 16 bits 
Sensor_Type (PIR:01, Acu: 10, Seis: 11) 2 bits 
Node ID 8 bits 
CDL 16 bits 
Sensor_Type (PIR:01, Acu: 10, Seis: 11) 2 bits 
Node ID 8 bits 
.  
.  
. (seven (7) more CDLs for a total of 10 CDLs 
6 bits 
 
Destination address: 1
Source address: 16 bits 
 
he application’s addressing scheme identifies whether the node is a relay, sensor or 
tor, 01-relay, 11-sensor 
x. of 15 groups 
odes, 01-PIR, 
• nique ID. 
ormal Operation Application and User Interface 
he front of the user interface is shown in Figure 34. 
T
coordinator node, the type of sensor node (PIR, Acu, or Seis), and the group it belongs to. 
The address is divided as follows: 
• Node type (2 bits): 00-coordina
• Group (4 bits): 0000 is reserved for the coordinator; Ma
• Sensor type (2 bits): 00 is reserved for the coordinator and the relay n
10-Acu, 11-Seis. 
Node ID (8 bits): U
 
N
 
T
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 PIR:
Acoustics:
Seismic:
G1 G2 G3 G4
Node in unknown state
Node reporting
START monitoring
STOP monitoring
CONFIGURE
Node stopped
NORMAL mode
Relay:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34 User interface in NORMAL mode 
 
 The user can START, STOP or CONFIGURE the WSN. The application in the laptop 
• T or CONFIGURE 
•  presses the CONFIGURE button the application will take the user to 
•  the application will not respond to the CONFIGURE and START 
 
ote: It is assumed that if a node does not respond it will be manually fixed (a person 
igure 35 shows the state diagram of the PC application. For the look of the SETUP 
•
will gather the data from the coordinator and make it available to the ATA. The 
messages from the relay nodes will also be used to update the tree shown in Figure 8, 
and indicate if a node is in unknown state (no data received from this node), operating 
normally or it has stopped after a STOP command has been sent.  
At initialization (beginning of the network life) the user can STAR
the network. 
After the user
the SETUP page. 
While monitoring,
buttons. The user must press the STOP button and wait until the network stops 
monitoring (indicated by blue nodes) to either START or CONFIGURE the network. 
N
will go and reset or fix the node). 
 
F
mode interface. 
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IDLE
WAIT ING
evSTART /
itsCOORDINAT OR->GEN(evNORMAL_ST ART _REQUEST)
evSET UP_RESPONSE evSTOP_RESPONSE
FAILED
tm(100000)
evFailureOK
MONIT ORING
evSTOP/
itsCOORDINAT OR->GEN(evNORMAL_ST OP_REQUEST ) evSTART _RESPONSE
evVCDL/cout<<"VCDL received: "<<params->packet.VCDL[0]<<endl;
SETUP
evCONFIG
evNORMAL
SENSOR_PARAMET ER_CHANG
evSET UP_SENSOR
SUBMIT _SENSOR
evSenOK/
SETUP_SENSOR(params->param_0,params->param_1);
evSUBMIT /
itsCOORDINAT OR->GEN(evSET UP_SENSOR_REQUEST(sen_param_0,sen_param_1));
SUBMIT _RELAY
evSUBMIT /
itsCOORDINAT OR->GEN(evSETUP_RELAY_REQUEST (rel_param_0, rel_param_
RELAY_PARAMETER_CHANG
evSET UP_RELAY
evRelOK/
SETUP_RELAY(params->param_0,params->param_1);
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35 PC Application State Diagram 
 
.3.2 WSN Setup Operation 
user of the WSN will adjust the parameters for the entire 
etup Operation Messaging  
UP operation are: 
ETUP_REQUEST_SENSOR  
igure 36 shows a SENSOR setup operation and Diagram 37 shows a RELAY setup operation. 
9
During SETUP operation the 
network via the user interface in the computer (see Figure 25). The coordinator will send 
a message to each sensor node individually in the WSN and wait for confirmation. 
 
S
The high level messages in SET
 
 
S
SETUP_REQUEST_RELAY  
SETUP_RESPONSE  
 
 
F
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Sensor_1:SEISMIC_
SENSOR
Relay_1:RELAY
SETUP_REQUEST_SENSOR()
SETUP_RESPONSE()
Tm(1ms)
Tm(1ms)
Tm(1ms)
Coordinator:COORDINATOR
SETUP_REQUEST_SENSOR()
SETUP_RESPONSE()
Tm(2*n ms)
Computer:PC_App
SETUP_REQUEST_SENSOR()
Sensor_2:SEISMIC_
SENSOR
SETUP_REQUEST_SENSOR()
SETUP_RESPONSE()
Sensor_n:SEISMIC_S
ENSOR
SETUP_REQUEST_SENSOR()
SETUP_RESPONSE()
The coordinator will send a SETUP_REQUEST_SENSOR message to all the Relay nodes  round robin fashion until it gets a SETUP_RESPONSE msg. from all. After
 it receives a SETUP_RESPONSE msg. from the last relay it will send a SETUP_RESPON to the computer
 in a
SE 
Figure 36 Message exchange dia sensor setup procedure 
 
 
gram for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37 Message exchange diagram for relay setup procedure 
Relay_2:RELAY Relay_1:RELAY
SETUP_REQUEST_RELAY()
SETUP_RESPONSE()
Tm(1ms)
Tm(1ms)
Tm(1ms)
Coordinator:COORDINATOR
SETUP_REQUEST_RELAY()
SETUP_RESPONSE()
Tm(2*n ms)
Computer:PC_App
SETUP_REQUEST_RELAY()
Relay_3:RELAY
SETUP_REQUEST_RELAY()
SETUP_RESPONSE()
Relay_n:SEISMIC_SE
NSOR
SETUP_REQUEST_RELAY()
SETUP_RESPONSE()
The coordinator will send a SETUP_REQUEST_RELAY message to all the Relay nodes in a round robin fashion until it gets a SETUP_RESPONSE msg. from all. After
 it receives a SETUP_RESPONSE msg. from the last relay it will send a SETUP_RESPONSE to the computer
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SETUP_REQUEST_SENSOR (39 bytes) 
8 bits (1) Type: (0 normal mode, 1 setup mode) 
Message: 8 bits (0) 
PIR  
Filter gain: 6 bits 1
Error threshold 1: 16 bits 
Error threshold 2: 16 bits 
Error threshold 3: 16 bits 
Error threshold 4: 16 bits 
Threshold Proportional factor: 16 bits 
Sampling rate: 8 bits 
Noise Window:  16 bits
CDL window size: 16 bits 
Acoustic  
Alpha 1: 16 bits 
Alpha 2: 16 bits 
Sampling rate: 16 bits 
CDL window size: 16 bits 
Seismic  
Threshold_seis 6 bits 1
Alpha 3 16 bits 
Sampling rate: 16 bits 
CDL window size: 16 bits 
Destination address: 16 bits 
Source address: 16 bits 
 
ETUP_REQUEST_RELAY (18 Bytes) 
8 bits (1) 
S
Type:  
Message: 8 bits (1) 
V-CDL PIR Threshold: 16 bits 
V-CDL ACU Threshold: 16 bits 
V-CDL SEI Threshold: 16 bits 
N-V-CDL PIR 16 bits 
N-V-CDL ACU 16 bits 
N-V-CDL SEI 16 bits 
Destination address: 16 bits 
Source address: 16 bits 
 
ETUP_RESPONSE (6 Bytes) 
8 bits (1) 
S
Type:  
Message: 8 bits (2) 
Destination address: 16 bits 
Source address: 16 bits 
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Setup Operation Application and User Interface 
• Once in the SETUP mode page the user can select to go back to NORMAL mode. It 
• op-
• BMIT button. After 
• . These nodes will turn red. Otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38 User interface in SETUP mode 
NORMAL monitoring
SETUP mode
PIR Acoustic Seismic
K1:   xxx                                 
K2:   xxx                                 
K3:   xxx                                 
OK
K4: xxx                       
fPIR: xxx                        
h: xxx                       
SENSORS SETUP
WSN sensor Setup
SUBMIT changes
Please wait
Operation Failed
!
OK
CLICK
Time Out
RELAYS SETUP
CLICK and close WSN sensor Setup window
CLICK
Relays
K1:   xxx                                 
K2:   xxx                                 
K3:   xxx                                 
OK
K4: xxx                       
fPIR: xxx                        
h: xxx                       
WSN relay Setup
CLICK
 
can also change the sensor parameters using the SENSORS SETUP button, and 
finally submit the new parameters using the SUBMIT button shown in Figure 38. 
After pressing the SENSORS SETUP button a WSN sensor Setup window will p
up as shown in Figure 38. The user can change the parameters of the sensors in this 
window. After the user is done changing the parameters in all the desired sensors 
He/She must press the OK button, which will close the window.  
In order for the changes to take effect the user must press the SU
pressing SUBMIT, the SETUP window closes and a waiting window opens. If 
operation success the user is taken back to the NORMAL window, which remains 
open all the time (until the user closes the application). If the operation fails, an 
Operation failed Window pops-up. The user clicks OK in this latter window and the 
user is taken back to the NORMAL window. 
Some nodes may not respond to the SETUP
they will go back to blue. 
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9.3.3 State Diagrams for Coordinator/Relay/Sensor nodes 
The state diagrams that follow are a slightly simplified version of the actual state 
machines that will be implemented. These state machines have been tested/validated by 
executing them in the Rhapsody Model Driven Development (MDD) environment. 
 
Coordinator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IDLE
STARTING
evNORMAL_START_REQUEST
CONFIGURING_RELAY
evSETUP_RESPONSE/
itsPC_App->GEN(evSETUP_RESPONSE);
evSETUP_RELAY_REQUEST/
rel_param_0=params->param_0;
rel_param_1=params->param_1;
STOPPING
evNORMAL_STOP_RESPONSE/
itsPC_App->GEN(evSTOP_RESPONSE);
CONFIGURING_SENSORS
evSETUP_SENSOR_REQUEST/
sen_param_0=params->param_0;
sen_param_1=params->param_1;
evSETUP_RESPONSE/
itsPC_App->GEN(evSETUP_RESPONSE);
REPORTING
evNORMAL_STOP_REQUEST
evVCDL/
itsPC_App->GEN(evSTART_RESPONSE);
evVCDL/
itsPC_App->GEN(evVCDL(params->packet));
evSANITY_CHECK/
cout<<"SANITY msg. :"<<params->ID<<endl;
Figure 39 Coordinator state diagram 
 
Relay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IDLE
REPORTING
tm(freq_sanity_check)/
it sCOORDINATOR->GEN(evSANITY_CHECK(ID));
CONFIGURING_RELAY
evSETUP_COMPLETED/
itsCOORDINATOR->GEN(evSETUP_RESPONSE);
evSETUP_RELAY_REQUEST/
rel_param_0=params->param_0;
rel_param_1=params->param_1;
[packet.VCDL[0]<50 && f irst_report==false]/
counter=0;
[packet.VCDL[0]>49 ||  first_report==true]/
it sCOORDINATOR->GEN(evVCDL(packet));
first_report=false;
counter=0;
evVCDL_COMPUTED
CONFIGURING_PIR_ACU_SENSORS
evSETUP_SENSOR_REQUEST/
sen_param_0=params->param_0;
sen_param_1=params->param_1;
PIR_ACU_sensor_ID=0;
SEI_sensor_ID=0;
evSETUP_RESPONSE/
//cout<<"PIR/ACU Sensor [ "<< PIR_ACU_sensor_ID<<"] has been setup"<<endl;
++PIR_ACU_sensor_ID;
CONFIGURING_SEIS_SENSORS
evSETUP_COMPLETED/
itsCOORDINATOR->GEN(evSETUP_RESPONSE);
evSETUP_SEIS_SENSORS
evSETUP_RESPONSE/
//cout<<"SEIS Sensor ["<< SEI_sensor_ID<<"] has been setup"<<endl;
++SEI_sensor_ID;
STARTING_PIR_ACU
evNORMAL_START_REQUEST/
PIR_ACU_sensor_ID=0;
SEI_sensor_ID=0;
counter=0;
evCDL/
packet.VCDL[counter]=params->CDL;
++PIR_ACU_sensor_ID;
++counter;
STARTING_SEIS
evSTART_SEIS_SENSORS
evCDL/
packet.VCDL[counter]=params->CDL;
++SEI_sensor_ID;
++counter;
evSTART_COMPLETED/
first_report=true;
STOPPING_SEIS
evSTOP_COMPLETED/
itsCOORDINATOR->GEN(evNORMAL_STOP_RESPONSE);
evSTOP_RESPONSE/
++SEI_sensor_ID;
++counter;
STOPPING_PIR_ACU
evNORMAL_STOP_REQUEST/
PIR_ACU_sensor_ID=0;
SEI_sensor_ID=0;
counter=0;
evSTOP_RESPONSE/
++PIR_ACU_sensor_ID;
++counter;
evSTOP_SEIS_SENSORS
 
Figure 40 Relay state diagram 
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PIR/Acoustic sensor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IDLE
CONFIGURING
evSETUP_SENSOR_REQUEST/
parameter_0=params->param_0;
parameter_1=params->param_1;
evSETUP_COMPLETED/
itsRELAY->GEN(evSETUP_RESPONSE);
SENSING
ACOUSTIC_SENSING
evACU_CDL_FAILED
SENSING_WAITING
tm(100)
evACU_CDL_COMPUTED
[ACU_CDL<50 && fi rst_report==false]
[ACU_CDL>49 | |  fi rst_report==true]/
itsRELAY->GEN(evCDL(ACU_CDL));
first_report=false;
report_number_acu=0;
PIR_SENSING
evPIR_SAMPLED/
acu_sample=1;
evACU_SAMPLED/
pir_sample=1;
evPIR_CDL_COMPUTED
[PIR_CDL< 50 && first_report==false]
[PIR_CDL>49 | |  first_repor t==true]/
itsRELAY->GEN(evCDL(PIR_CDL));
first_report=false;
report_number_pir=0;
evPIR_CDL_FAILED
evNORMAL_START_REQUEST/
first_report=true;
report_number_pir=0;
report_number_acu=0;
pir_sample=1;
evNORMAL_STOP_REQUEST/
itsRELAY->GEN(evSTOP_RESPONSE);
Figure 41 PIR/Acoustic state diagram 
 
Seismic sensor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IDLE
CONFIGURING
evSETUP_SENSOR_REQUEST/
parameter_0=params->param_0;
parameter_1=params->param_1;
evSETUP_COMPLETED/
itsRELAY->GEN(evSETUP_RESPONSE);
SENSING
REPORTING
[CDL< 50 && first_report==false]
[CDL>49 || first_report==true]/
itsRELAY->GEN(evCDL(CDL));
report_number=0;
first_report=false;
MEASURING
evCDL_COMPUTED
evCDL_FAILED
tm(f_seis)
evNORMAL_STOP_REQUEST/
itsRELAY->GEN(evSTOP_RESPONSE);
evNORMAL_START_REQUEST/
first_report=true;
report_number=0;
 
Figure 42 Seismic state diagram 
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Table interface between PC Application and Anticipatory Theory Application 
 
The PC application receives VCDL messages from the coordinator and writes to a file 
with the format shown in Table 1 in a comma separated value (CSV) file format.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Table that stores the data from the sensors in the WSN 
…
timestamp PIR1 PIR2 ACU1 ACU2 SEIS1 SEIS2 status code PIR1 PIR2 ACU1 ACU2SEIS1SEIS2 status code PIR1 PIR2 ACU1 ACU2 SEIS1 SEIS2 status code
CDL … sc CDL … sc CDL … sc
… … … … … …
… … …
… … …
… … …
… …
Group 1 Group 2 Group k
…
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
The data in Table 1 grows up to a certain point and then the oldest values are discarded as 
soon as new values arrive due to memory limitations. Physical location of the groups and 
sensors is known a-priori. 
 
The status code (sc) identifies the sensors that are not reporting normally. Sensors that are 
not reporting normally are not reliable and need to be fixed manually, which involves 
removing the sensor node from the network. The sc is constructed based on the 
SANITY_CHECK message received from the coordinator. The sc is encoded following 
the order in Table 1, and indicating with a Zero (0) that the node is not reporting, and 
with a One (1) that the node that is reporting normally. For instance, if sc = 100101 => 
PIR2, ACU1, and SEIS1 are not reporting normally in this group at the time indicated by 
the timestamp. In order to decode sc a possible way is to perform six “AND” operations 
between the sc and all the unitary basis vectors of dimension 6 (i.e., 000001, 000010, 
000100, 001000 etc).  
 
The data in Table 1 is also used by the PC app GUI of the WSN to show the status of the 
nodes in the network. 
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APPENDIX I - DEMO 
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